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WHITEHEAD V. WHITEHEAD
The Problem Of The "Newcomer's Divorce"
Whitehead v. Whitehead'
Plaintiff wife filed complaint for absolute divorce on October
21, 1969. She alleged domicile or physical presence of at least three
months in the Third Judicial Circuit of Hawaii, a jurisdictional re-
quirement of section 580-1 of Hawaii's divorce statute.2 She did not
purport to comply with the second requirement of the statute, continuous
residence in the state for a period of one year,' but contended that that
1. Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 5505 (3d Cir. Family Ct. Hawaii, Mar. 30,
1970) [hereinafter cited as Whitehead].
2. "Exclusive original jurisdiction in matters of annulment, divorce, and separa-
tion ... is conferred upon ... the family court of the circuit in which the applicant
has been domiciled or has been physically present for a continuous period of at least
three months next preceding the application therefor." HAWAII REV. LAWS § 580-1
(1968).
3. "No absolute divorce from the bond of matrimony shall be granted for any
cause unless either party to the marriage has been domiciled or has been physically
1970]
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requirement was unconstitutional." Service was made on defendanthusband in Utah by mail. He filed no answer. The State of Hawaii
sought and was granted leave to enter the case as defendant-intervenor
"for the sole purpose of defending the constitutionality of the statute" 5
as a legitimate exercise of its legislature's power to formulate policy
on divorce matters.
The court acknowledged the state's interest in preserving marriage,but noted that the question before it was not whether all applicants fordivorce must wait a year or must submit to reconciliation efforts beforefiling for divorce.' The question, it said, was whether, under the
United States Constitution, a state can deny access to its divorce courts
to a resident of less than one year when a resident of more than oneyear is not so denied. The court expressly found that plaintiff was
domiciled in Hawaii by virtue of her physical presence for three
months with the intent to remain.7 The plaintiff having satisfied
the jurisdictional requirement of the statute, the court held that she
was entitled to access to the courts under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
The fourteenth amendment forbids any state to "deny to anyperson within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."" The
courts have never held that the equal protection clause denies the
states the right to classify persons for legitimate governmental pur-poses. The Supreme Court has held, however, that a classification
will be void if it is "without any reasonable basis, and therefore is
purely arbitrary."' This traditional test of the constitutionality of a
present in the State for a continuous period of at least one year next preceding the
application therefor." HAWAII REV. LAWS § 580-1 (1968).4. Plaintiff's main contention was that the residence requirement infringed onher right of interstate movement, given constitutional sanctity in Shapiro v. Thompson,394 U.S. 618 (1969). Plaintiff further contended that the state distinguished betweenresidents and nonresidents in the absence of a compelling state interest, thereby denyingher equal protection of the laws. Plaintiff's final assertion discussed by the court wasthat the residence requirement denied equal access to the courts. Assertions thatenforcement of the requirement resulted in racial discrimination and in violations ofthe commerce clause of the Constitution were not discussed by the court. See Brieffor Plaintiff at 6-9, Whitehead.
5. Brief for Defendant-Intervenor at 2, Whitehead.6. That question was raised in an Illinois case in which a waiting period for alldivorce actions was found to deny equal protection. The court found that "[t]helegislature has no more power to discourage the filing of divorce cases by postponingthe right of access to the courts than it would have to discourage actions for personalinjury by similar measures." People ex tel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332,118 N.E.2d 262, 268-69 (1954).
7. In addition to the clear language of the statute conferring jurisdiction togrant a divorce after a three-month presence (see note 2 supra), the court cited Powellv. Powell, 40 Hawaii 625 (1954), for the proposition that "[d]omicile can be estab-lished by the concurrence of . . . physical presence and intent to remain. . . . 'Nodefinite period of time is necessary....'" Whitehead at 3. But Powell involveda separate maintenance action, and the Powell court expressly noted that such suitsmay be governed by requirements different from those for divorce actions. 40 Hawaiiat 630. In other words, the establishment of domicile in the latter case may entail alonger period of residence. Cf. Zumwalt v. Zumwalt, 23 Hawaii 376, 380 (1916),holding the one-year residence requirement for divorce in the Organic Act of theTerritory of Hawaii, on which present Hawaii law is based, to be "mandatory andjurisdictional."
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
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classification allows the classification to stand "if any state of facts rea-
sonably can be conceived that would sustain it. . ... 10 The traditional
test has been widely used to protect businesses from discriminatory
regulation." In cases dealing with such "fundamental rights" as the
right to be treated in a manner which is not racially discriminatory,1 2
the right to vote, 3 and the right of a criminal defendant to a fair
trial,' 4 the Supreme Court has imposed a stricter test of the reasonable-
ness of the classification.' 5  In those cases the distinction between
classes must bear some relationship to the purpose of the legislation, 6
and the classification must serve a "compelling state interest.'1 7  The
Whitehead court used this latter test, following the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson 8 that the right to engage
in interstate travel is a fundamental one 9 that is chilled by the
existence of a waiting period.
The Third Circuit Family Court of Hawaii found that the bases
for the one-year waiting period which the state had advanced were
insufficient even under the traditional test. They were not reasonable,
much less compelling.
I. REASONABLE BASIS
The court dealt first with the possibility that Hawaii could be-
come a "divorce haven" if only three months of residence were neces-
sary to obtain a divorce, an argument that the state had not put forth.
The court dismissed that possibility as a matter to be "met with policy
and program, '20 rather than by judicial decision, apparently suggesting
that the legislature could make the grounds for divorce unattractive
to all potential plaintiffs if it wished to keep Hawaii from becoming
a second Nevada, but that the state could not simply legislate new-
10. Id. The test may have been given a new meaning in 1970: "The Court holds
today that regardless of the arbitrariness of a classification it must be sustained if
any state goal can be imagined that is arguably furthered by its effects." Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.20; F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412 (1920).
11. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1960) (Sunday closing laws
affecting only some businesses) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61(1911) (ban on pumping of natural gas for some uses).
12. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
13. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
14. E.g., Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) ; Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305 (1966) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
15. "[W]e have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights
and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had
history and tradition on its side." Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (cita-
tions omitted).
16. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964).
17. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). Shapiro represented the
consolidation of appeals from decisions of three three-judge district court panels which
had held unconstitutional one-year residence requirements for public welfare assist-




20. Whitehead at 3.
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comers out of its courts by establishing an unreasonable waiting period
as a jurisdictional requirement.
The court rejected the state's contention that the waiting period
is required in order to enable the court to acquire "reliable and
credible evidence"21 on the plaintiff's right to a divorce. The judge
found it inconsistent to require a delay for that reason in divorce
actions but not in complaints for separation or annulment when,
in all three actions, petitioner has the burden of proof, and the court
can deny relief if that burden is not met. 2
The interest which the state claimed to be of "paramount priority"
was in the "[p]rotection of the welfare of the children affected by
the dissolution of a marriage .. ."2' The court, however, rejected
the contention that a residence requirement would serve this interest
as "long out of date and .. .not well taken, '2 4 giving two reasons:
Hawaii statutes provide other, more effective, ways to protect children
in unfortunate home situations ;2' and delaying the court's jurisdiction
over a hostile family situation by means of the one-year waiting
period may actually have an adverse effect on any children involved.26
The Whitehead court thus put forth strong arguments against
the effectiveness of the residence requirement, noting that it is
"difficult to understand and appreciate the thought that marriages
can be preserved in the State" through the enforcement of the waiting
periodY.2  Under the traditional test of equal protection, however,
the constitutionality of a classification is determined by whether "any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it,"2 8 not by
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Brief for Defendant-Intervenor at 8, Whitehead.
24. Whitehead at 8.
25. See, e.g., HAWAII REv. LAWS § 580-11 (1968), providing for custody arrange-
ments during the pendency of a divorce action; § 571-11, giving the family courts
immediate jurisdiction over any minor in need of help; and § 571-46(6), providing that
an order of custody is not final, but is always subject to modification by the courts.
In general, since Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279 (1945), the courts
have accepted a doctrine of "divisible divorce," which permits a verdict to be rendered
on the dissolution of marriage alone in one action, with matters of custody, support
and division of property left for determination in separate actions. See, e.g., Morris,
Divisible Divorce, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1287 (1951); 30 MD. L. REv. 63 (1970).
For a discussion of reasons for leaving complicated matters of jurisdiction
out of determinations of custody, see Justice Traynor's opinion in Sampsell v. Superior
Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
26. The court suggests that the children will either have to "endure an environ-
ment where two hostile and incompatible parents live together" or live under the
temporary custody arrangements made by the parents independent of the assistance
of the court. Whitehead at 6.
The court did not raise another point in opposition to the child welfare argu-
ment: that the classification would be overinclusive. The Shapiro court attacked a
residence requirement intended to exclude from the state those indigents whose aim
in coming was to obtain higher welfare benefits, because the statute effectively barred
indigents with more noble purposes as well. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631
(1969). Similarly, if the welfare of the child is the primary concern of Hawaii's
divorce legislation, the legislature cannot create a class which includes childless divorce
applicants with less than one year of residence. For a discussion of overinclusiveness,
see Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1086-87
(1969).
27. Whitehead at 2.
28. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1960).
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whether the reviewing court agrees with the justification put forth29
or believes that the statute "may not succeed in bringing about the
result it tends to produce.""0 Applying the traditional test properly,
the Whitehead court might have found that the residence requirement
is reasonable, even though it might not be the best device for pre-
serving marriages and safeguarding the interests of children. As the
United States Supreme Court noted in Dandridge v. Williams,"' "In
the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made
by its laws are imperfect. '32  The imperfections would make the
classification unconstitutional only if fundamental rights were denied.
II. RIGHTS DENIED
Mrs. Whitehead claimed, as did the plaintiffs in Shapiro v.
Thompson,33 that the residence requirement had a chilling effect on
her right to travel interstate. 4 In Shapiro the Supreme Court found
that right "fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union,""5 though
not explicitly granted in any single clause of the Constitution. 6 Be-
cause it is a fundamental right, the right to travel interstate cannot
be denied to indigents any more than it could be denied to any other
class of citizens, absent a compelling state interest.37 The interests
of Pennsylvania, Connecticut and the District of Columbia in limiting
expenditures for public assistance were not considered compelling,38
nor were the alternative arguments based on administrative convenience
and public policy. 9 Therefore, requiring applicants for public assistance
to endure a waiting period before receiving benefits constituted a denial
of equal protection.
The Shapiro Court provided few clues as to what waiting periods
might not inhibit interstate travel, expressly withholding any judgment
on residence requirements for "eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-
29. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) ; Goesaert
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552 (1947).
30. Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929).
31. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
32. Id. at 485.
33. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
34. But see Commissioners' Prefatory Note to UNIFORM DIVORCE REcOGNITION
ACT OF 1948, expressing the view that the opening of divorce courts to non-domicili-
aries will create another kind of inequality: "Those able to embark on divorce-seeking
tours obtain a discriminatory advantage over their fellow-citizens."
35. 394 U.S. at 630, citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
36. The Court cites cases suggesting that the right to travel rest on the privileges
and immunities clause of section 2 of article I, the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the commerce clause, and the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. 394 U.S. at 630 n.8.
37. Other rights that have been protected by the compelling state interest test are
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (first amendment rights) ; Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (encroachments upon personal liberty); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (civil rights of a single racial group).
38. 394 U.S. at 633.
39. The states defending the waiting period requirement contended that it facili-
tated the planning of the welfare budget, minimized duplication of benefits offered by
other states, minimized fraud, and encouraged early entry into the job market by
newly-arrived indigents. Id. at 634.
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free education, to obtain a licence to practice a profession, to hunt or
fish, and so forth."40 Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Shapiro,
found "nothing in the opinion of the Court to explain this dichotomy"'"
among various residence requirements. The dichotomy can be ex-
plained by the nature of the benefits to which access is delayed by the
waiting period; for example, knowledge of a one-year waiting period
for welfare benefits, which might be necessary to sustain life, is likely
to chill the exercise of the right to move from one state to another,
whereas knowledge of a one-year waiting period for a hunting license
probably would not. This is not to say that there is a fundamental
right to have welfare benefits ;42 Shapiro held simply that, if with-
holding of a benefit would, as a matter of fact, inhibit the exercise
of the right to travel to a state,4 s the waiting period must be justified
by a compelling state interest, and that a state's desire to prevent
the inflow of indigents is not such an interest. In the aftermath of
Shapiro, judicial determinations of which waiting period requirements
will invoke the "compelling state interest" test have indicated that
making the factual determination of whether a waiting period will
inhibit travel is not a simple matter. What is more, some courts havejumped directly to an analysis of the strength of a state's argumentsfor a given residence requirement without making the necessary factual
determination of whether the particular waiting period will inhibit
interstate travel.44
In cases presenting close analogies to the Shapiro public as-
sistance problem, two federal district courts have invalidated state
statutes imposing waiting periods on applicants for public housing."'
A North Carolina district court voided as unconstitutional a statute
requiring one year of residence for applicants for the state bar examina-
tion, noting that, if a man can be prevented from earning a livingin his chosen profession, he will surely hesitate to exercise his right
to travel among the states. 46 A California court, on the other hand,
40. Id. at 638 n.21.
41. Id. at 654 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
42. To the contrary, the Supreme Court since Shapiro has upheld the right of astate to impose maximum grants on large families of welfare recipients, noting thatthe fact that the state practice would deny "the most basic economic needs of im-poverished human beings ...gives the federal courts no power to impose upon theStates their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy." Dandridge v.Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).43. The waiting period requirements attacked in Shapiro had not, in fact, in-hibited plaintiffs' right to travel. As Chief Justice Warren noted in his dissent, all ofthe plaintiffs "found alternative sources of assistance after their disqualification."394 U.S. at 650 n.5 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). There is, of course, no way of know-ing whether the residence requirement deterred other potential travelers.It is not unusual to find "questions of constitutional power [turning] in thelast analysis on questions of fact. This is particularly the case when an assertion ofstate power is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the FourteenthAmendment." United States v. Arizona, 91 S. Ct. 260, 326 (1970) (Brennan, White& Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).44. See, e.g., Burg v. Caniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970) ; Vaughan v.Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz. 1970).45. King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 314 F. Supp. 427(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Cole v. Housing Authority, 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I.), aff'd,435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
46. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
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made specific findings of fact that a policy of charging higher state
college tuition to those who had not lived in the state for at least
a year would not inhibit those planning to move to the state47 and
upheld the law establishing the policy, finding reasonable essentially
the same considerations found not "compelling" in Shapiro."' The
California Supreme Court found that a law imposing stricter criminal
sanctions on a nonsupporting father who left the state than on one
who remained in California 'had a strong chilling effect on the right
to travel and was unconstitutional.4 9  An Arizona statute permitting
the superintendent of a state hospital to return nonresident inmates to
the states of their residence was invalidated without a specific finding
that the unavailability of continued hospitalization would be a factor
in deterring immigration of the mentally ill; the classification fell
because the district court found it unrelated to the state's interest
in the welfare of the patient.50
The greatest inconsistencies have been in the voting rights deci-
sions. The Supreme Court, in a case requiring five separate opinions,5'
has recently upheld the right of Congress to abolish state residence
requirements of more than thirty days for voters in presidential
elections. 52 The Court had previously upheld durational residence re-
quirements for voters in federal elections,5" but that decision predated
both Shapiro and the Voting Rights Amendments of 1970. Since
Shapiro, eight federal district courts have been faced with challenges
to residence requirements for voting in Congressional elections: three
have held the waiting period requirements constitutional ;54 five have
held them unconstitutional.55 None of the reported cases have discussed
47. Kirk v. Board of Regents, 78 Cal. Rptr 260, 266-67 (1969), appeal denied
per curiam, 396 U.S. 554 (1970) ("for want of a substantial federal question").
48. The court in Kirk v. Board of Regents said that "payment of taxes, fiscal
integrity and budgetary planning . . . may well be reasonably related to legitimate
objectives of the State of California for the purpose of imposing residence conditions
on attendance at a university or state college." Id. at 269. But see Note, Residence
Requirements after Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 134, 152-55 (1970),
in which the writer contends that residence requirements for lower college tuition
cannot survive a consistent reading of Shapiro and suggests that the Kirk court
misconstrued Shapiro.
49. In re King, 3 Cal. 3d 226, 474 P.2d 983, 90 Cal. Rptr 15 (1970).
50. Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz. 1970).
51. United States v. Arizona, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970).
52. The case represented a consolidation of several challenges to the Voting
Rights Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 314. Title II of the Amendments prohibited the
imposition of any residence requirement longer than thirty days for voters in presi-
dential elections. Justice Black upheld that provision of the act under Congress'
"broad authority to create and maintain a national government .. " 91 S. Ct. at
269. Justice Stewart, writing for the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, found it
obvious that Congress could protect the right of a citizen to vote for the chief
executive "when Congress may protect the right of interstate travel from other less
fundamental disabilities." 91 S. Ct. at 348. Justice Douglas found the elimination
of residence requirements to be a "permissible" exercise of Congress' authority to
enforce the fourteenth amendment. 91 S. Ct. at 278. Justice Harlan would have held
that Congress had no right to ban residence requirements. 91 S. Ct. at 309-10.
53. Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 380
U.S. 125 (1965).
54. Sirak v. Brown, (E.D. Ohio 1970), cited in 91 S. Ct. at 276-77 n.11; Coca-
nower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (D. Ariz. 1970) ; Piliavire v. Hoel, 320 F. Supp.
66 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
55. Burg v. Caniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970) ; Blumstein v. Ellington,(M.D. Tenn. 1970), cited in 91 S. Ct. at 276-77 n.11; Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp.
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whether, as a matter of fact, a person would be deterred from moving
to another state by a residence requirement for voting.5 6
Like several of the courts cited, the Third Circuit Family Court
of Hawaii made no finding on whether the residence requirement
for divorce plaintiffs would actually have the effect of chilling the
right to travel interstate. Had the court found the residence require-
ment reasonable, it would not have had to make the more difficult
finding of fact on the effect of the waiting period. However, having
found the classification of residents and nonresidents unreasonable for
divorce purposes, the court might have found that the waiting period
had no effect on interstate movement of citizens. Having held by
implication that the requirement did inhibit movement from state to
state, the court still could have found that Hawaii has a compelling
interest in limiting the jurisdiction of its courts which is served by
the residence requirement.5 7
Residence requirements for divorce actions, besides inhibiting
interstate movement, appear to infringe upon a second fundamental
right encompassed by the equal protection clause - that of equal
access to the courts.5" The landmark Griffin v. Illinois" held that,
if a state has opened its courts to criminal appeals, it can not dis-
criminate against those unable to pay the cost of a transcript. The
Whitehead court applied the Griffin test precisely, noting that Hawaii
did not have to open its courts to divorce applicants, but having done
so, it could not practice "invidious discrimination."60  The Griffin
reasoning that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has' 6' has been
extended to end discriminatory treatment of indigents in many phases
of criminal proceedings. 62 Although it has been said that equal access
to civil courts was a primary concern of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment,6 3 the courts have found "constitutional concerns more
107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) ; Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Va. 1970) ; Affeldt
v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ind. 1970),
56. The United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction of one
case challenging the constitutionality of state residence requirements for voters in
state elections. Ellington v. Blumstein, 39 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1971).
57. See Sections III, IV and V infra.
58. "The loss of access to the courts in an action for divorce is a right of sub-
stantial magnitude, when only through the courts may redress or relief be obtained."Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 87 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968). "Resort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a
realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court."
Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S. Ct. 780, 785 (1971).
59. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
60. Whitehead at 5.
61. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
62. See, e.g., Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (transcripts of habeas
corpus hearing); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (repayment of transcript
costs by imprisoned indigent); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (court-
appointed counsel on appeal); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (filing fees
on appeal).
63. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885), stating that the equal pro-tection clause was drafted to give the people "like access to the courts of the country
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compelling"" in criminal cases and have hesitated to require equal
access to the courts in civil actions." However, recently in Boddie
v. Connecticut,6 the Supreme Court 'held that requiring an indigent
plaintiff to pay the court costs involved in a divorce action is contrary
to due process of law because of the "basic position of the marriage
relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant
state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relation-
ship. .. ."67 The majority cited Griffin, though, only in rejecting Con-
neeticut's contention that court fees were validly used to protect limited
fiscal resources and recoup costs.68 The majority cited with favor the
New York case of Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 9 but never mentioned the
Kings County Supreme Court's holding that requiring an indigent
plaintiff to pay the publication costs in a divorce action denies her
equal protection of the laws, 70 and stopped well short of the New York
court's dictum that the right to divorce is "as basic as Griffin's right
to appeal and Mrs. Harper's right to vote." ' The selection of the
due process argument over one based on equal protection clearly was
a conscious decision; two concurring opinions argued convincingly
that the case could have been resolved in the plaintiff's favor on the
basis of equal protection.72
It would appear, then, that the plaintiff in Whitehead would
have been well advised to couch her challenge to Hawaii's residence
requirement for divorce in terms of due process. But in its discussion
of due process, the Court was careful to qualify the right to a court
hearing as one granted "within the limits of practicality."' In a
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas made reference to an overriding
practicality in a divorce proceeding - the jurisdictional requirement
of domicile.7 4 The state's interest in limiting the jurisdiction of its
courts would seem to outweigh the plaintiff's argument that the
residence requirement is a denial of due process or equal protection.
Indeed, that jurisdiction may in fact depend on length of residence.
for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs,
and the enforcement of contracts ... " See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312(1921).
64. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 83 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1968). "Civil lawsuits ... are not like government prosecutions for crime....
Our Federal Constitution, therefore, does not place such private disputes on the same
high level as it places criminal trials and punishment." Boddie v. Connecticut, 91 S.
Ct. 780, 793 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968), fev'd,
91 S. Ct. 780 (1971).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 788.
69. 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968), noted in
29 MD. L. REV. 406 (1969), cited at 91 S. Ct. 780, 787-88 n.8.
70. 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
71. Id.
72. 91 S. Ct. at 789-90 (Douglas, J., concurring) and at 790-92 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
73. Id. at 787.
74. Id. at 790. See notes 75-78 infra.
1970]
376 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXX
III. JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to grant a divorce traditionally is based upon the
domicile75 of at least one of the parties76 in the state of the granting
court. 7  The vast majority of states require domicile.7 s  However,
the requirement is neither constitutionally mandated 9 nor universally
accepted."0 New Mexico's Supreme Court has found it insupportable
"to flatly declare that there may be no other relation between a state
75. Domicile (or domicil) is generally defined as residence plus animus manendi(intent to remain). See, e.g., Epstein v. Epstein, 193 Md. 164, 66 A.2d 381 (1949) ;In re Newcomb's Estate, 192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 950 (1908). The charge to the juryin the trial of the second Williams case defined domicile as the place where one"'voluntarily fixed his abode . . . not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but
with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefiniteor unlimited length of time.'" Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 236 (1945).The appellate court in that case defined domicile as "a nexus between person and placeof such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of
the utmost significance." Id. at 229.
In some states mere physical presence for a period of time establishes domicile.A Georgia court has held that residence on a military base in the state for therequired statutory period constitutes domicile. Hunt v. Hunt, 225 Ga. 276, 168 S.E.2d321 (1969). A New York court accepted as domicile "actually dwelling in the stateat the time the action was commenced." Brown v. Brown, 55 Misc. 2d 174, 284N.Y.S.2d 947, 949 (1967). Even Nevada, the home of the migratory divorce, holdsthat residence acquired for the sole purpose of divorce does not satisfy the jurisdic-tional requirement of domicile. See, e.g., Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d 872(1937) ; Presson v. Presson, 38 Nev. 203, 147 P. 1081 (1915). But see 58 HAav. L.REV. 930, 946 (1945): "It is Nevada which calls the tune for the swearing to theinitial indefiniteness of any intent to leave, instead of being satisfied on paper as sheis in fact with an intent to stay just long enough to get a divorce, or so very little
longer."
76. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 110 (1934) suggests that a state may exercisejurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses both domiciled in the state" and§ 113 indicates that a state may take jurisdiction if one spouse is domiciled in the stateunder certain circumstances; but § 111 provides that a state is barred from exercisingjurisdiction if neither spouse is domiciled within the state. For the most part, statestatutes follow the RESTATEMENT pattern. See V MARTINDALE & HUBBELL LAW
DIRECTORY Passim (1970).
77. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) : "Under our systemof law, judicial power to grant a divorce - jurisdiction, strictly speaking - isfounded on domicil." See also Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Hartigan
v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961) ; Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73,36 So. 2d 236 (1948). But see David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1954): "One wonders, too, what 'system of law' Mr. JusticeFrankfurter had in mind in making that statement, for we as a nation do not have a
'system of law' with respect to domestic relations."
78. V MARTINDALE & HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY passim (1970).79. "This court is convinced that the concept of domicile is not entitled to con-stitutional sanctity." Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1958).See also Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 678 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, C.J., dissenting) ;Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212, 142 P. 230 (1914); Schillerstrom v.Schillerstrom, 75 N.D. 667, 32 N.W.2d 106 (1948).80. New York has held since 1862 that marriage in the state is sufficient to giveNew York's courts jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage, regardless of where theparties have been domiciled since the wedding ceremony. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss,205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651-52 (1954).
Most states include as domiciliaries servicemen residing on military bases orstationed within the state. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (1964);VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (1960). "Domicile is not the sole jurisdictional basis fordivorce unless made so by statute." Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24, 25 (Alas.1964). The special statutes pertaining to servicemen are designed to avoid a situationin which the serviceman could not claim domicile in his home state because of hisabsence from it, but could not seek a divorce in the state in which he was stationedbecause of a lack of intent to remain. Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity BetweenDue Process and Full Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1389 (1967).
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and an individual which will create a sufficient interest in the state
under the due process clause to give it power to decree divorces. '8 1
There are two reasons given for the requirement of domicile or
another close relationship. One explanation treats divorce as a quasi
in rem proceeding and declares that "domicile in the state gives the
court jurisdiction of the marital status or the res or subject matter
which the court must have before it in order to act. Jurisdiction
of the res is essential because the object of a divorce action is to sever
the bonds of matrimony, and unless the marital status is before the
court, the court cannot act on that status. '8 2 The other major theory
sees divorce as an in personam action complicated by the need for
"orderly surveillance" of all marriages by the state.83 Any court
which could acquire jurisdiction by personal service on the defendant
might render a divorce decree, but only a state in which one of the
parties is domiciled will have a sufficient interest in the marriage.
The reason for different jurisdictional prerequisites for in personam
decrees dissolving a marriage and, for example, in personam decrees
in ordinary contract actions is that the state has a greater interest in
marriage than in other contractual relationships: "Upon the integrity
of the marriage depend such vital matters as the welfare of children
and other dependents, the allocation and devolution of property, and,
in a more general sense, much of the moral and religious fiber of
the community."8 4
Establishing the jurisdiction of the court poses few problems when
two Hawaii residents seek to dissolve their marriage in Hawaiian
courts on grounds established by the Hawaiian legislature .8  The
complications ensue when individuals claiming domicile in Hawaii for
some purposes seek divorces in other states or, as in the instant case,
when newcomers to Hawaii seek to invoke her divorce laws. Previous
discussion of divorce jurisdiction has been concerned with the "mi-
gratory divorce," in which a party establishes residence in a new state
specifically to take advantage of its substantive divorce law with no
intention of remaining after the decree is granted.' The number of
persons who move to Nevada just long enough to obtain a decree
81. Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1958).
82. Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725, 729 (1961).
83. Developments in the Law, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909,
970 (1960).
84. Id. at 969-70. See also Boddie v. Connecticut 91 S. Ct. at 785 (opinion of theCourt) and 792 (Black, J., dissenting).
85. "[T]he right to have the bonds of matrimony dissolved is limited to the
causes . . . prescribed by the statute." Worthington v. District Court, 37 Nev. 212,142 P. 230, 241 (1914). Eleven grounds for divorce are prescribed in HAWAII REV.
LAws § 580-41 (1968).
86. There is a corresponding problem of "migratory marriage," in which in-dividuals, particularly young persons, cross state borders to avoid home-state age
requirements, provisions for parental permission, or waiting periods. See R. LEvy,
UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORcE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 18-41. Thatproblem generally gets less attention than migratory divorce because marriage is
encouraged as much as divorce is discouraged. Developments in the Law, State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HA&v. L. REv. 909, 970 (1960).
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is documented and is staggering."7 On the other hand, an unknown
number of American citizens change their permanent residences each
year and must endure a waiting period in a new state before com-
mencing divorce litigation. At present, those seeking "newcomers'
divorces" are subject to the rules developed to discourage migratory
divorce."
IV. MIGRATORY DIVORCE
In 1942, the Supreme Court held in Williams v. North Carolina9
that a divorce decree granted to a domiciliary of one state must be
given full faith and credit9" in the state of domicile of his absent
spouse, even though the enforcement of the decree conflicts with the
policy of the latter state. This blow to state sovereignty in divorce
policy was softened in the second Williams case 9' in which the
Court permitted the second state to challenge the finding of domicile
by the granting state through a bigamy proceeding.9" Subsequent
decisions have extended the right to challenge migratory divorce decrees
on jurisdictional grounds to parties residing in the "true" domiciliary
state who were not involved in the original divorce proceeding. 3 The
reason for encouraging collateral attack on divorce decrees granted
to non-domiciliaries was articulated in Justice Jackson's dissenting
opinion in the first Williams case. "The right of each state to experi-
ment with rules of its own choice for governing matrimonial and
social life is greatly impaired if its own authority is overlapped and its
"194own policy is overridden by judgments of other states ....
87. In 1942, for example, 8,616 divorces were granted in Nevada. In 1943 the
figure jumped to 11,399. That year it is estimated that Nevada received more than
$500,000 in divorce fees alone. See RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS - A COMPARATWE
STUDY 394 n.18 (1945). The figures support a feeling held by neighboring states
that Nevada's divorce policies are "economically oriented." CAL. A.J. RES. 17 (1965).
88. A major objection to granting divorces to new residents is advanced by
Justice Frankfurter in asserting Massachusetts' right to attack a divorce decree
granted to one of its residents in Florida: "[A] person who enjoys its other institu-
tions but is irked by its laws concerning the severance of the marriage tie, must
either move his home to some other State with more congenial laws, or remain and
abide by the laws of Massachusetts. He cannot play ducks and drakes with the
State .. " Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 361 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
89. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
90. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
91. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
92. In the second Williams case, the finding resulted in the imprisonment of Mr.
Williams and his Nevada wife for bigamous cohabitation in North Carolina. Id. In
Murphy v. Murphy, 200 Ark. 458, 140 S.W.2d 416 (1940), the challenge to domicile
resulted in the voiding of a divorce decree, although Mr. Murphy had already taken
a new wife who knew nothing of the fraudulent decree.
93. It had been held earlier that parties who had litigated the question of domicile
in one state could not collaterally question it in another. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32
(1938). Res judicata was later extended to cover the issue of domicile in cases in
which the defendant appeared but did not challenge the court's jurisdiction. Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). But the state or an absent party may attack an
ex parte action.
94. 317 U.S. at 315 (Jackson, J., dissenting). This became the opinion of the
Court in the second Williams case. "[T]he decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudica-
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Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has established a
standard for the degree of proof of domicile that will bar collateral
attack on jurisdictional grounds in another state.95  With domicile
at best an elusive concept,96 states have imposed residence requirements
on divorce applicants in order to give a higher degree of certainty
to their exercise of jurisdiction.97
V. RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
Every state has some residence requirement which must be met
by either the plaintiff or the defendant in most divorce actions.98 The
length of time a person must reside in the state before he can file a
divorce complaint ranges from six weeks in Nevada99 and Idaho' °
to two years in Delaware,' 0' New Jersey, 0 2 Rhode Island °3 and
Wisconsin."' The residence requirements are sometimes shortened
when the cause of action is adultery or extreme cruelty or when the
cause arises in the forum state. 05 The period is lengthened in some
states when the divorce action is based upon nonsupport or incurable
insanity. 06
Opinion is divided on whether satisfaction of a waiting period
requirement becomes an additional element of jurisdiction, so that a
plaintiff's failure to comply with the residence requirement leaves the
court powerless to act on his petition.10 7 If a state court holds that the
tion of everything except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and domicilis a jurisdictional fact. To permit the necessary finding of domicil by one State toforeclose all States in the protection of their social institutions would be intolerable."
325 U.S. at 232. "No justifiable purpose is served by imparting constitutional sanctity
to the efforts of petitioners to establish a false and fictitious domicil in Nevada." Id.
at 242 (Murphy, J., concurring).
95. "The Williams case, supra, did not speak on the subject of what constitutes
a bona fide domicile, and until this definition has been made by legislation or other-
wise, we are to apply such common sense and homely rules as take account of true
actualities rather than glib expressions of intention." Shuart v. Shuart, 183 Misc. 270,51 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1944). See Hammond v. Hammond, 45
Wash. 2d 855, 278 P.2d 387 (1954).
96. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 678 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, C.J., dissenting);Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (1951). See Reese, Does
Domicil Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 COLUse. L. REv. 589 (1955), contending thatdomicile is not and should not be a unitary concept having the same meaning in
every context.
97. "[Tjhe validity of subsequent marriages, the status of children, title to prop-
erty, rights of inheritance and many other incidents of life are rendered uncertain by
the cloud of invalidity hanging over the 'tourist' divorce." Commissioners' Prefatory
Note to UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITioN AcT.
98. V MARTINDALE & HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY pasrsi (1970).
99. NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020(e) (1969).
100. IDAHO CODE § 32-701 (1947).
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1525 (1953).
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-10 (1952).
103. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-12 (1969).
104. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 247.05(3) (Supp. 1970).
105. V MARTINDALE & HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY passim (1970).
106. Id.
107. "The requirement that the residence must have continued for a certain number
of months or years is not jurisdictional . . . and the finding of the court on the length
of residence is conclusive on the courts of another state. . . ." RESTATEMENT OF
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residence requirement is not jurisdictional, it would still consider a
divorce decree granted to one who has not satisfied the requirement
voidable on direct challenge. 08 That some residence requirement may
serve a useful and lawful purpose is apparently conceded by both the
plaintiff and the court in Whitehead. Both accepted without question
the right of Hawaii to require three months' residence in the judicial
circuit as a jurisdictional requirement for divorce.109 Furthermore, a
finding that a longer waiting period is not a jurisdictional requirement
would not automatically make it an unreasonable discrimination against
certain divorce plaintiffs.
If, however, the residence requirements are used only as means
for "avoiding difficult factual determinations [by establishing] a
blanket exclusion of all those in the doubtful category," 110 they may
indeed be unconstitutional"' because the difficulty of making a deter-
mination is not a reasonable basis for failing to make it. In discussing
the right of newcomers to a state to vote in presidential elections,
Justice Marshall stated: "That there are borderline cases [of bona fide
residence] among the new arrivals is not a constitutionally sufficient
reason for denying the [right] to those who have settled in good
faith.""' Courts competent to determine other complicated matters of
fact are certainly capable of deciding whether a divorce plaintiff
intends to stay within their jurisdiction. 118 But the existence of statutes
indicating that the legislature believes domiciliary intent can be inferred
from residence for a given period of time will retard or inhibit altogether
the development of judicial alternatives.
This means that Mrs. Whitehead and other "newcomer's divorce"
plaintiffs will be without any forum for their complaints. They cannot
CONFLICTS § 110, comment b (1934). See Hamblin v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. 364,
233 P. 337 (1925); Hammond v. Hammond, 45 Wash. 2d 855, 278 P.2d 387 (1954).
But see Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N.E. 260 (1891) and Crownover v.
Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954), holding that residence requirements
are jurisdictional. See also Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224, 213 A.2d 545 (1964),
holding requirement jurisdictional by implication.
108. See Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 291 (1948).
109. Brief for Plaintiff at 1, Whitehead; Whitehead at 7.
110. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 55 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). "One can
have an absence of intent to remain . . . a moment after a divorce is obtained even
though the required waiting period is a full year instead of six weeks." 58 HARv. L.
REV. 930, 1010 (1945). "The place may in good faith become one's actual residence
the first day he arrives there if he really intends to make it his domicile or home."
Blair v. Blair, 149 Kan. 3, 85 P.2d 1004, 1006 (1939).
111. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969).
112. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 55-56 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).113. "In most cases, it is no more difficult to determine whether one recently
arrived in the community has sufficient intent to remain to qualify as a resident thanit is to make a similar determination for an older inhabitant." Hall v. Beals, 396
U.S. 45, 55 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that the
appellant had bought a home, registered a car, obtained a driver's license, entered his
child in school, and secured a permanent job in Colorado before attempting to register
to vote. Advice given to attorneys in a published treatise supports Justice Marshall's
contention. C. Clinton Clad suggests telling clients seeking divorces in states where
their domicile is questionable to affirmatively indicate an intention to abandon theformer domicile by taking such measures as formally resigning club memberships and
retaining letters accepting such resignations; notifying the credit bureau and can-
celling checking accounts; selling one's cemetery lot; buying a one-way, not a round-
trip, ticket to one's destination; and even publishing a notice of change of residence.
C. CLAD, FAMILY LAW 136-38 (1958).
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honestly claim domicile in the state from which they moved because
they lack both present residence and the intent to remain. On the
other hand, they cannot satisfy the waiting period in the state in
which they could most effectively pursue their action. They have two
options: they may commit perjury and claim domicile in the state from
which they moved; or they may linger for a period of one year, more or
less, in a state of marital limbo. A third option should be available.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of reform efforts should be to assure to every divorce
plaintiff a forum for his complaint. There has been resistance to
establishment of nationwide uniformity on the procedural side of
divorce litigation, a resistance apparently inspired by fear of estab-
lishment of a national policy on substantive divorce law." 4 Efforts
by the states to deal uniformly with the problem of interstate recognition
of migratory divorce decrees have also failed,"' perhaps because of
similar fears of erosion of state sovereignty. An earlier writer suggested
that Supreme Court efforts to apply a consistent policy on residence
requirements would be possible but ill-advised."' Another commentator
has suggested that Congress could use the full faith and credit clause".7
to require the recognition in every state of a divorce granted to a
party meeting certain minimal jurisdictional requirements in a given
state.118 If Congress were to establish such a jurisdictional minimum,
an argument might be made that requiring additional proof of juris-
diction for state residents would be a denial of equal protection or
due process. It would establish two different standards for divorce
jurisdiction that would discriminate against the state's residents without
a reasonable basis.
A simpler, more rational solution to the problem of the newcomer's
divorce is available to the states. Statutes could be adopted requiring
residence in the state at the time of filing, plus the intent to remain
114. "It seems obvious . . that national jurisdiction over the termination of
marriage must entail assumption of control over the entire institution. The prospect
of centralization thus presented is out of harmony with American practice." Com-
missioners' Prefatory Note to UNIFORM DIVORcE RECOGNITION AcT.
115. The Uniform Annulment of Marriage and Divorce Act drafted in 1907 was
adopted in three states only. The subsequent Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of
1930 was not in force in any state when the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act was
recommended to the states in 1948. As of 1967, this last effort had been accepted in
ten states. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 133-34 (1951); 9A UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOTATED 457-58 (1970 Repl. Vol.).
116. "[Tjhis would be judicial legislation with no guide but reason in its formu-
lation, and it would still leave open to inquiry all disputes whether the finding of
residence was justified." 58 HARv. L. REv. 930, 1011 (1945).
117. See note 90 supra.
118. "Congress may under the clause describe a certain [procedural] type of
divorce and say that it shall be granted recognition throughout the Union, and that
no other kind shall." Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
371, 388 (1933). See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945) ; Developments in the Law, State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HAv. L. REv. 909, 912 (1960).
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demonstrated by tangible evidence.1 19 The potential divorce plaintiff
could still, by moving, seek to be heard in a state more sympathetic
to his substantive complaint than the one he left. But instead of
satisfying a short residence requirement and claiming a false intent
to remain, he would have to plead and prove his domiciliary intent
as a crucial factor in his case. Such a statute would have the virtue
of providing for the newcomer's divorce without encouraging the
migratory divorce.
Hawaii is discriminating against new residents when it denies
them the right to seek divorces until they have lived in the statefor a year. The state's action does not constitute a denial of equalprotection, however, if length of residence is the best available means
for determining the jurisdiction of a state court to grant a divorce;
that is, if the classification of plaintiffs according to length of resi-dence serves a legitimate state interest. In a highly mobile society,intent to remain in a state would appear to be a more logical deter-
minant of a state court's jurisdiction.
119. See the suggestions made by Justice Marshall and attorney C. Clinton Clad
cited in note 113 supra.
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